This paper addresses the existence of Nash networks for the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000) in a number of different settings. We provide conditions for the existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogeneous and players obtain resources from others through the directed path between them. We find that costs of establishing links play a vital role in the existence of Nash networks.
Introduction
The importance of networks in economic and social activities has led to the emergence of a growing literature seeking to understand the formation of these networks.
This literature in economics has focused on three main questions: (i) What are the incentives for self-interested players to form links with each others and what are the set of the stable resulting networks? (ii) What networks are efficient? and (iii) Is there a conflict between the set of stable and efficient networks?
We can discern two distinct strands in the literature differentiated by the type of stability concept used.
The first type employs the notion of pairwise stability and its variants and is inspired by Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996 [9] ) work. These authors assume that a link is formed between two players if both players involved in the link agree to form that link, though link deletion occurs unilaterally. While benefits depend on the overall graph, the cost of setting up a relationship is shared equally between the two participating players. In a pairwise stable network no pair of players has an incentive to form a link and no player has an incentive to delete a link. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pairwise stable networks can be found in Jackson and Watts (2001 [8] ) .
The second literature develops a non-cooperative version of network formation. This literature was initiated by Bala and Goyal (BG, 2000 [1] ). These authors assume that a player can establish a link with another player without the latter's consent, as long as she incurs the cost of forming the link. They present two versions of their model: the one-way flow model and the two-way flow model. In the one-way flow model, only the (link) initiating player has access to the other player's information, whereas in the 2 two-way flow model both players have access to each others information, regardless of who initiates the link. For both versions, the corresponding static stable networks are called Nash networks since Nash equilibrium is used to determine stability. In a Nash network, no player has an incentive to change her links, given the links formed by the other players.
The reason why Nash equilibria is an adequate concept for the one-way flow model but not for the consent model is that no coordination problem arises over setting up links in the former and each links anouncement is guaranted to change the network.
Most of the existing studies in this literature have explored the characterization of Nash networks, either in the two-way flow model (Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2005 [5] ), Haller and Sarangi (2005 [7] ) or in the one-way flow model (Galeotti, 2004 [4], Billand and Bravard, 2005 [2] ). The existence of Nash networks however has not been studied in great detail. Indeed, although BG (2000 [1] ) provide a constructive proof of the existence of Nash networks in the one-way flow model and the two-way flow model, this is done in a rather restrictive setting, since the authors assume that all costs and benefits are homogeneous across players. In a recent paper Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi (2005 [6] ) study the existence of Nash networks in two-way flow models by incorporating value, cost and link heterogeneity. However, the existence issue had remained unexplored in the one-way flow setting.
In this paper, we investigate the existence of Nash networks in BG's one-way flow model when costs and values of links are heterogeneous and players use pure strategies.
More precisely, we focus on one-way flow model with linear payoffs and no decay.
The one-way flow model is worth studying since it includes some important settings. For instance, a web site can provide a link or pointer to another web site without the second web site's permission. Likewise, a researcher can generally cite another researcher without the second researcher's permission. Lastly, firms can unilaterally establish links with other firms, through intelligence economic activities, which include among others reading of industry trade press or patent literature, talking with technology vendors, sales representative or industry experts, and analyzing the competitors' product.
Moreover, the question of existence of equilibria under heterogeneity is important, since ex-ante asymmetries across players arise quite naturally in reality. For instance, in the context of information networks, it is often the case that some individuals are better informed, which makes them more valuable contacts. Similarly, as individuals differ, it seems natural that forming links is cheaper for some individuals as compared to others.
For instance, players can be defined in terms of cultural, legal or geographical proximity, and it may be cheaper for a given player to set a link with a closer player.
We can discern three types of heterogeneity. The first one, value heterogeneity, concerns the value of the ressources of a given player for the other players. The second one, cost heterogeneity, concerns the cost of forming a link with a given player for the other players. The third type of heterogeneity, link heterogeneity, concerns the probability that a link formed by a player with a given player fails to transmit information from the latter player to the former player. It may also concern the loss of information that is incurred when information is transmitted from a player to another player.
The introduction of various heterogeneity conditions for costs, values and links provides a sensitivity check for the results obtained with homogeneous parameters. In other words, we can ask if the introduction of different kinds of heterogeneities in the Bala and Goyal's model alters the Nash networks existence results.
Our results concerning the existence of Nash network in the ono-way flow model under various heterogeneity assumptions complement the existing literature. Indeed, Galeotti, (2004 [4] ) characterizes the (strict) Nash networks when cost and values of links are heterogeneous, but we do not know under what conditions such equilibria exist. Finally, the existence of Nash networks has never been studied, when there are congestion effects. The possibility of congestion effects was introduced by Billand and Bravard (2005 [2] ) as an extension of BG's model (2000 [1] ). Congestion effects exist in several situations where getting too many resources can actually prove an hindrance to agents.
For instance, when researchers are seeking to get some information about a part of their field which they are unsure about, they often read a literature survey written by another scholar. This activity is costly in terms of time and effort, for instance, to identify relevant information sources. The reading effort can be expensive and tedious if they are too many sources. In extreme cases, if a survey is too exhaustive, it might have little or no value to the scholarly reader. Billand and Bravard (2005 [2] ) characterize Nash networks when this assumption arises. However, they do not address the issue of existence of Nash networks.
We now provide a quick overview of our results. We show that there does not always exist a Nash network when costs and values are heterogeneous. More precisely, we find that, as in the two-way flow model, heterogeneity of cost in forming links plays a great role in the non existence of Nash network. We then provide conditions on costs of setting links to allow for the existence of Nash networks. We also show that if costs are homogeneous, then there always exist Nash networks. Finally, we show that if costs and values are homogeneous, but congestion effects can occur, then a Nash network does not always exist.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set the basic oneway flow model. In Section 3 we present the results about the existence of Nash networks in this model. More precisely we first study this problem under various heterogeneity conditions for costs, values and links. We then introduce the presence of congestion effects in Section 4.
Model Setup
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. The network relations among these players are formally represented by directed graphs whose nodes are identified with the players. A network g = (N, E) is a pair of sets: the set N of players and the edges set E(g) ⊂ N ×N of directed links. A link initiated by player i to player j is denoted by i, j. Pictorially this is depicted as link from j to i to show the direction of information flow.
1 Each player
which describes the act of establishing links. More precisely, g i,j = 1 if and only if i, j ∈ E(g). The interpretation of g i,j = 1 is that player i forms a link with player j = i, and the interpretation of g i,j = 0 is that i does not form a link with player j. We only use pure strategies. Note that g i,j = 1 does not necessarily imply that g j,i = 1. It can be that i is linked to j, but j is not linked to i. Let G = × n i=1 G i be the set of all possible networks where G i is the set of all possible strategies of player i ∈ N.
We now provide some important graph theoretic definitions. For a directed graph, g ∈ G, a path P (g) of length m in g from player j to i, i = j, is a finite sequence network g by C(g). In the empty network,ġ, there are no links between any agents.
To sum up, a link from a player j to a player i (g i,j = 1) allows player i to get resources from player j and since we are in a one-way flow model, this link does not allow player j to obtain resources from i. Moreover, a player i may receive information from other players through a sequence of indirect links. To be precise, information flows from player j to player i, if i and j are linked by a path of length m in g from j to i.
Let
N i (g) = {j ∈ N| there exists a path in g from j to i}, be the set of players that player i can access in the network g. By definition, we assume that i ∈ N i (g) for all i ∈ N and for all g ∈ G. Let n i (g) be the cardinality of the set N i (g). Information received from player j is worth V i,j to player i. Moreover, i incurs a cost c i,j when she initiates a direct link with j, i.e. when g i,j = 1. We can now define the payoff function of player i ∈ N:
We assume that c i,j > 0 and V i,j > 0 for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, i = j. Moreover, we assume that V i,i = 0 for all i ∈ N. The next definition introduces the different notions of heterogeneity in our model. 
Values (or costs) are said heterogeneous by players if for
We now provide some useful definitions for studying the existence of Nash networks.
Given a network g ∈ G, let g −i denote the network obtained when all of player i's links are removed. The network g can be written as g = g −i ⊕ g i , where the operator ⊕ indicates that g is formed by the union of links in g i and g −i . The strategy g i is said
to be a best response of player i to g −i if:
The set of player i's best responses to g −i is denoted by
Definition 2 We say that two networks g and g ′ are adjacent if there is a unique player i such that g i,j = g ′ i,j for at least one player j = i and if for all player
An improving path is a sequence of adjacent networks that results when players form or sever links based on payoff improvement the new network offers over the current network. More precisely, each network in the sequence differs from the previous one by the links formed by one unique player. If a player changes her links, then it must be that this player strictly benefits from such a change.
Definition 3 Formally, an improving path from a network g to a network g ′ is a finite sequence of networks g 1 , . . . , g k , with g 1 = g and g k = g ′ , such that the two following conditions are verified :
1. g ℓ and g ℓ+1 , are adjacent networks; 8 2. for this unique player i, we have g
is a network where i plays a best response while g ℓ is a network where i does not play a best response.
Moreover, if g 1 = g k , then the improving path is called an improving cycle.
It is obvious that a network g is a Nash network if and only if it has no improving path emanating from it.
Finally, we define η : G → Ê, η(g) = i∈N n i (g) as a function. Proof Let N = {1, 2, 3}. We begin with the empty networkġ. Eitherġ is a Nash network and we are done, orġ is not a Nash network and there exists an improving path fromġ to an adjacent network g 1 . That is, there exists a player, say without loss of generality player 1, such thatġ 1 ∈ BR 1 (ġ −1 ) and g 1 1 ∈ BR 1 (ġ −1 ). Since 1 ∈ N has no link inġ and forms links in
. Now we will repeat the same step. Assume an improving path from a network g 1 to a network g k where for each player i ∈ N, we have
We show that if there exists an improving path from g k to g k+1 , then for each
Indeed there are two possibilities for j ∈ N i (g k ).
1. Either g k i,j = 1, that is i directly obtains the resources of player j. Then there are two possibilities.
, otherwise i does not play a best response in g k+1 .
•
and
for all k ′ < k and for all j ∈ N, we have ℓ ∈ N j (g k ) and player i deletes her link with j only if j ∈ N ℓ (g k ) and
case, i forms a link with ℓ and j ∈ N i (g k+1 ).
Or g
, that is i indirectly obtains the resources of player j. Then, we use the same argument as above to show that player i deletes her link with ℓ only if she has an incentive to form a link with j and j ∈ N i (g k+1 ).
We now show that there does not exist any cycle in an improving path Q = {ġ, g 1 , . . . ,
In other words, we show that if g
Without loss of generality, we suppose that player i deletes the link i, j for the first time, between t and t + h, in g t+h . Likewise, we assume that player i forms the link i, j for the first time, between t + h and t + h ′ , in g t+h ′ .
We have two cases.
1. Suppose we have g t i,ℓ = 0. To obtain a contradiction, assume that ℓ ∈ N i (g t ).
It follows that g t+h j,ℓ = 1 since player i does not form the link i, ℓ between g t and g t+h if j preserves the link j, ℓ. Also j does not delete the link j, ℓ between g t and g t+h if i does not form the link i, ℓ (recall that in our process only one player changes her strategy at each period). Since player i chooses to delete the link i, j in g t+h , then she must form the link i, ℓ and we must have g
Moreover, we note that the substitution of the link i, j
by the link i, ℓ implies that c i,j > c i,ℓ . Using same argument, player ℓ has not deleted the link ℓ, j between g t+h and g t+h ′ . Therefore, if player i forms the link i, j in g t+h ′ (and so deletes the link i, ℓ), then we have c i,j < c i,ℓ and we obtain the desired contradiction.
2. Next, suppose that we have g Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} be the set of players and V i,j = V for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N.
More precisely, we suppose that c 1. In a best response, player 2 never forms any link with player 3 or player 4. Moreover, player 2 has an incentive to form a link with player 1 if the latter gets resources from player 3 or player 4.
2. In a best response, player 4 never forms links with player 3 or player 2.
3. Then the unique best response of player 1 to any network in which she does not observe player 3 is to add a link with player 3 (since player 2 and player 4 never form a link with player 3). Moreover, we note that player 1 never has any incentive to form a link with player 2 or player 4. Therefore, a Nash network does not exist. Finally, by appropriately adjusting costs, it can be verified that this example holds even if we relax the assumption that This example shows that existence results in one-way flow model with heterogeneity depends crucialy on the number of players. Indeed, the proof of existence of Nash networks with three players is based on the following fact. After a given player i has played a best response, the set of players whom she obtains resources always contains the set of players whom she obtained resources before.
Our example stresses that this property does not hold anymore when n > 3. More precisely, in this example, player 3's best response leads him not to obtain resources from player 2 anymore in network g 4 .
Existence of Nash networks and heterogeneity of values by pairs
In this section, we present a proof of the existence of Nash network in the one-way flow model where values are heterogeneous by pairs and costs are heterogeneous by players.
This proof can not be similar to the proof of Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi (2006 [6] ) who adress the Nash existence problem in the two-way flow model. Indeed, to prove that a Nash network always exists, the authors built a sequence of networks, beginning with the empty network. At each step of the sequence, a player who does not play a 13 best response gets an opportunity to modify her links and play a best response (if no player has an incentive to modify her links, then the network is Nash). A distinctive feature of this process is that there can not exist a step in the sequence where a player has an incentive to modify her links and as a consequence to let another player get access to the resources of a smaller number of players than in the preceding step. Since the number of players is finite, there inevitably exists a step in the sequence where the corresponding network is a Nash network. In the one-way flow model, the above characteristic is no longer true. As a consequence, we cannot exclude the existence of cycles in the best response process. So we will not be able to conclude about the existence of Nash networks The following example is an illustration. 
Proposition 2 If values of links are heterogeneous by pairs and costs of links are heterogeneous by players, then a Nash network exists.
The proof of Proposition 2 is long, and involving a number of lemmas. So we first provide a quick overview of the proof. It consists of constructing a sequence of networks,
. .) beginning with the empty network. In each subsequent network, no player should have an incentive to decrease the amount of resources she obtains.
Note that this sequence of networks is not an improving path. Indeed, we go from g called h(br i (g t )). Thirdly, we delete all links i, j which does not allow player i to obtain additional resources in h(br i (g t )). We obtain a network called m(h(br i (g t ))) = g t i , and in the sequence Q, we have g t+1 = g t i . When a player i receive an opportunity to revise her strategy, we go from a network g t−1
to a network g t , and we will show that η(g t−1 ) < η(g t ). Since the amount of resources that players can obtain in a network g ∈ Q is finite, Q is finite and there exists a Nash network.
In the following paragraph, we define a class of networks G 3 which contains all networks in the sequence Q. Then, we provide a condition which implies that no player has an incentive to delete a link in a network g ∈ G 3 (Lemma 2). Finally, we show that all networks g t ∈ Q satisfy this condition since the empty network satisfies this condition (Lemma 6).
Let us formally define the set is at most one path from a player i ∈ N to a player j ∈ N. In the following, we can take, without loss of generality, any element of M(g). Let m(g) be a typical element of
M(g). Obviously, we have η(g) = η(m(g)).
We say that g is a minimal network if g = m(g). We denote by G m the set of minimal networks. Let
a subset of minimal networks. If g ∈ G 2 and g contains a cycle, then we denote by C(g) the cycle in the network g. We denote by N C(g) the set of players who belong to the cycle C(g), and E C(g) ⊂ N C(g) × N C(g) the set of links which belong to the cycle
= 0} be the set of networks which belong to G 2 and where there does not exist any link from a player i ∈ N C(g) to a player j ∈ N C(g) .
We now present some lemmas which allow us to prove Proposition 2. The first lemma presents some properties about links that cannot arise in the set G 3 .
Lemma 1 Suppose values of links are heterogeneous by pairs and costs of links are
heterogeneous by players and g ∈ G 3 .
1. If g j,i = 1, then there does not exist a player k such that g k,i = 1.
If g
is an empty set.
Proof We successively prove both parts of the lemma.
1. To obtain a contradiction suppose that there exist two players i and j such that g j,i = 1 and g k,i = 1 in g ∈ G 3 . Then there are two possibilities:
Suppose i ∈ N C(g) . Given that i ∈ N C(g) there can be at most one link to player i. Hence it is not possible that j ∈ N C(g) and k ∈ N C(g) simultaneously. Only one of them is in N C(g) . Without loss of generality let j ∈ N C(g) . Then g k,i = 1 violates the fact that g ∈ G 3 .
From the minimality of g we know that j / ∈ N k (g) and k / ∈ N j (g). Putting all
. This is a contradiction.
Suppose there exists a player
. Then, there exist two different paths from player k to player i which is impossible by the minimality of g.
It follows that if g ∈ G 3 , then we can write π j i (g) as follows:
In the following lemma, we let g ′ i ∈ G i be a strategy of player i, with g ′ i = g i . This lemma provides the best response properties of the networks g ∈ G 3 .
Lemma 2 Suppose values of links are heterogeneous by pairs, costs of links are hetero-
geneous by players and g ∈ G 3 .
Suppose players
2. Suppose g contains a cycle C(g) and for all i ∈ N C(g) , and for all i, j ∈ E C(g) , we have π
Proof We now prove each part of the lemma.
1. Let players i, j and k be such that j ∈ N i (g), i ∈ N j (g) and k ∈ N j (g). By lemma 1.1, we know that g k,i = 0. Either already i ∈ N k (g) and the formation of the link k, i is not a best response for player k, or i ∈ N k (g). In the latter case, we have
follows that player k does not play a best response if she forms a link with player i.
2. Without loss of generality, let C(g) be such that N C(g) = {1, 2, . . . , p} and E C(g) = {p, 1; 2, 1; 3, 2; . . . ; 1, p}. For simplicity now consider a player i = p.
It is straightforward from π i−1 i (g) > 0 and the minimality of g that player i does not play a best response if she deletes the link i, i − 1 ∈ E C(g) and does not replace that link.
We first show that player i cannot play a best response if she replaces the link i, i − 1 by a link i, k, with k = i − 1. Indeed, if player i replaces the link i, i − 1 by a link i, k, k ∈ N i (g), then player i is not playing a best response.
We now show that if player i replaces the link i, i − 1 by a link i, k, k ∈ N i (g), then player i does not play a best response. Indeed, since g ∈ G 3 , there does
a player ℓ ′ ∈ N C(g) such that g k ′ ,ℓ ′ = 1. In that case, g ∈ G 3 and we obtain a contradiction. Likewise, there does not exist a player k ∈ N i (g) such that
there exists a player ℓ ′ such that g ℓ ′ ,ℓ = 1, with ℓ ′ ∈ N i (g) and a player k ′ such that g k ′ ,ℓ = 1, with k ′ ∈ N k (g) which is impossible by lemma 1.1. It follows that a player i ∈ N C(g) cannot obtain the resources of a player ℓ
from a player k ∈ N i (g). Hence, if player i replaces the link i, i − 1 ∈ E C(g) by a link i, k with k ∈ N i (g), then player i does not play a best response.
3. It is straightforward from π j i (g) > 0 and the minimality of g that player i has no incentive to delete the link i, j if she does not replace that link.
We now show that player i has no incentive to replace the link i, j. In other words, we show that there does not exist a player k who obtains a part of the resources of j and allows i to obtain more resources than j.
Let k be such that N k (g) ∩N j (g) = ∅. Then player i has no incentive to substitute the link i, k to the link i, j.
If the former is true the proof is obvious and we will only focus on the latter. Note that in g,
such that g ℓ j ,ℓ = g ℓ k ,ℓ = 1, which is impossible by Lemma 1.1.
Second, we must show that there does not exist a player k ∈ N, such that
, who obtains the resources of j and allows i additional
g) and in that case player i cannot obtain a part of the resources of player j due to a link with player k, since g is a minimal network. Therefore, we just need to show that the above statement is true for strict set inclusion. To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exists a
Then there exists a player ℓ k ∈ N k (g) such that g ℓ k ,j = 1. Therefore, we have g ℓ k ,j = 1 and g i,j = 1 which is impossible by Lemma 1. 
be the set of players who belong to a cycle in g. Let H : G → P(G) be a correspondence. A network h(g) ∈ H(g) is a network associated with g such that h(g) contains at most one cycle, C(h(g)). Moreover, if k is such that ℓ ∈ N k (g) and
This is different from the networks in G 2 since there is no minimality restriction here.
This operation creates one cycle leaving unchanged the strategies of those players that do not form a part of the cycle.
Observe that for all g ∈ G and for all k ∈ N, we have, by construction, for all
Finally, we define
to be a network obtained from g after performing the three operations defined above.
Note that the superscript in g i refers to the fact that in this network player i is playing a best response.
Proof We must show that g i has the following four properties: it is a minimal network, it contains at most one cycle, there does not exist a link from
The first property follows from the correspondence M and the next two from the correspondence H. We just need to verify that the last property is enjoyed.
First, we show that in br i (g), we have ℓ ∈ N j (br i (g)), j ∈ N ℓ (br i (g)), i ∈ N j (br i (g))
. By definition, we have br i (g) k = g k , for all k ∈ N \ {i}. Hence, if we
show that player i ∈ N j (br i (g)) has not formed a link i, ℓ with a player ℓ such that ℓ ∈ N j (br i (g)) and j ∈ N ℓ (br i (g)) in br i (g), then we will have shown the conclusion for br i (g). But, by Lemma 2.1, we know that if i has formed a link with player ℓ, then i is not playing a best response which is a contradiction.
The next lemma covers properties of networks in g i and br i (g).
Proof We successively prove each part of the Lemma.
1. Observe that for all k = i, and for all j ∈ N, we have
, then there exists a player k such that k ∈ N i (g) and
Since g ∈ G 3 , we know from Lemma 2.2 and 2.3, that player i will not be playing a best response if she deletes one of her links. Hence, if k ∈ N i (g), then k ∈ N i (br i (g)), and we obtain the desired conclusion.
2. We know from the first part of the lemma that N j (g) ⊆ N j (br i (g)), and we know
The result follows.
3. From the second part of the lemma, we know that
We now show that if
By Lemma 2.2 and 2.3, we know that player i cannot be playing a best response if she deletes links.
Hence, if she is playing a best response, it must be that
we conclude that
Let us denote by g \ MBR i (g −i ) = gm. Then gm ⊕ i, j is the network obtained from br i (g) when player i forms no link except the link i, j.
Lemma 5 Suppose g ∈ G 3 .
If g
i i,j = br i (g) i,j = 1, then, for all j ∈ N \ {i}, N j (gm ⊕ i, j) ⊆ N j (g i −i ⊕ i, j).
Suppose for all
Proof We prove the two parts of the lemma successively.
and g i i,j = 1, player j does not obtain any resources from player i. Moreover, we have by construction,
23
Assume that j ∈ N C(g i ) , g i i,j = br i (g) i,j = 1 and there exists a player ℓ such that ℓ ∈ N j (gm ⊕ i, j) and ℓ ∈ N j (g i −i ⊕ i, j). So in br i (g), player i obtains resources from player ℓ through a path containing j, and in g i player i obtains resources from player ℓ through a path which does not contain j, since for all k ∈ N,
Hence, there is a player j ′ where
and j ′ ∈ N j (g i ) who has formed a link with player ℓ between br i (g) and g i . This
is not possible by construction. 
.
and N ℓ (g) ⊆ N ℓ (g i ) by Lemma 4.1 and 4.2. In other words, player k obtains resources from player j in g through a path which contains ℓ, and in g i player k
obtains resources from player j through a path which does not contain ℓ. Hence, there exists a player who has formed a link with a player ℓ ′ where
and k ∈ N ℓ ′ (g i ) between g and g i . This is not possible by construction of g i .
Lemma 6 Let g i be defined as in equation (3).
Proof We now prove successively the two parts of the lemma. (2) we have: 
then by construction of g i , there is at least one player ℓ ∈ N C(g i ) , such
where player i forms a link with player ℓ ′ , and by
. Finally, by Lemma 3, we know that g i ∈ G 3 . Hence 25 using the marginal profit function defined in equation (2) we have:
2. First, we show that for all i ∈ N \ {k}, and for all
, by construction of g k , player i has a link with
. So using the marginal profit function defined in equation (2) we have:
Next, we show that for all i ∈ N \ {k}, and for all
and there exists a link from player j to player i,
We deal with these two possibilities successively.
We note that for
player i forms a link with player h ′ , and by construction π
We know from Lemma 5.2 that for all j ∈ N, we have
. Finally, we know by Lemma 3 that g i ∈ G 3 . Hence, using the marginal profit function defined by equation (2), we obtain:
We assume, without loss of generality, that player i forms in C(g i ) a link with a player j such
player i forms a link with player h ′ . Also by construction π
We know by Lemma 3 that g i ∈ G 3 . Again, using the marginal profit function defined by equation (2), we obtain:
Proof of Proposition 2 We start with the empty networkġ = g 0 . It is straightforward to check that g 0 ∈ G 3 . Either g 0 is a Nash network, and we are done, or there exists a player, say i, who does not play a best response in g 0 . In that case, we construct the
We know from Lemma 4.3 that η(g 0 ) < η(g 1 ). From Lemma 3, g 1 ∈ G 3 and from Lemma 6.1 and 6.2, we know that for all players j ∈ N and 
Proposition 2 establishes that if values of links are heterogeneous by pairs of players and costs of links are heterogeneous by players, then a Nash network always exists. This result is similar to the result of Haller and al. [6] in two-way flow models. We now study 
Let π j i (g) denote the marginal payoff of player i from player j in the network g. If
. We can rewrite π j i (g) as follows:
To prove the following proposition, we need an additional definition. First, we note that we cannot use our previous recomposition of the best response network. More precisely, the definition of H is not appropriate in the case of heterogeneous cost. Indeed, in the previous section, we could place the players in the cycle without restriction because there is no difference for player i to form a link with player j or player k since the costs are the same. However, this is not true in the case of heterogeneous costs.
So, let H i : G → G be a correspondence where h i (g) ∈ H i (g) satisfies the following conditions.
• If g contains at most one cycle and there does not exist any link from a player j ∈ C(g) to a player k ∈ C(g), then g = h i (g).
In one-way flow models with homogeneous players BG [1] establish that Nash networks always exist. We show that this result is no longer true when the payoff function incorporates congestion effects -a phenomenon that frequently arises in many network settings. Billand and Bravard (2005 [2] ) characterize Nash networks under congestion effects. In this section, we use their framework to show the non-existence of Nash networks.
Let us define φ : N × {0, . . . , n − 1} → IR, (x, y) → φ i (x, y) be such that:
Let c i (g) = j =i g i,j be the costs incurred by i in the network g. We now define the payoff function of player i ∈ N as π i (g) = φ i (n i (g), c i (g)).
As before we assume that player i obtains her own resources. We now provide an example where a Nash network does not exist.
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and φ 1 (2, 1) > φ 1 (1, 0) > φ 1 (3, 1), max {φ k (2, 1) , φ k (3, 2)} < φ k (1, 0) < φ k (3, 1), for k ∈ {2, 3}.
First, networks in which a player forms two links are not Nash.
Second, the unique best response of player 2 (respectively 3) to any network g ′ in which player 1 and player 3 (respectively 2) have formed no link is to form no link.
Moreover, the unique best response of player 1 to a network g in which player 2 and player 3 have formed no link is to form a link with player 2 or player 3. Therefore, the empty network is not a Nash network.
31
Third, a network g where n 1 (g) = 2 cannot be a Nash network. Indeed, it is obvious that n 1 (g) = 3 cannot be a Nash network since φ 1 (1, 0) > φ 1 (3, 1) > φ 1 (3, 2) . Moreover, a network g where n 1 (g) = 1 cannot be a Nash network. Indeed, in a Nash network where player 1 has formed no links, players 2 and 3 cannot have established any links, since at least one of these players gets the ressources of one player only and we have φ k (2, 1) < φ k (1, 0), for k ∈ {2, 3}. In that case, when players 2 and 3 create no links, player 1 has an incentive to establish a link with player 2 or player 3. To sum up if there exists a Nash network g, then n 1 (g) = 2.
Without loss of generality, we consider networks g in which player 1 has formed a link with player 2. In these networks, 1. player 2 has not formed a link with player 3 because in that case 2, 3 ∈ N 1 (g) and player 1 would have an incentive to delete the link 1, 2.
2. Player 3 has an incentive to establish a link with player 1, since φ 3 (1, 0) < φ 3 (3, 1).
3. The networks in which a player has formed two links are not Nash networks.
Hence a Nash network does not exist.
The previous result remains true when players are homogeneous. But in that case, examples are more complicated because we need at least 7 players to show a Nash network does not always exist.
Discussion
Our different results lead to two questions. The first one is: Can the introduction of the show that there does not always exist a Nash network in a framework with homogeneous costs, heterogeneous values (by pairs) and decay. The second one is: How the results of the paper are sensitive to the assumption of linearity in values and costs. This question will be the subject of a future work.
